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   1
The State stands on earth and so is in the sphere of caprice, chance and 
error 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right 
 
It is upon the Navy under the Providence of God that the safety honour 
and welfare of this realm do chiefly attend 
Preamble to articles for the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1652-54 
I  General reflexions on the formation of states and the growth of national 
economics 
Efficient states govern successful economies that provide high standards of welfare for 
their citizens. Among Anglo-American economists that outcome is now widely 
represented as emanating from a process of ‘Smithian growth’ – a label that includes the 
extension and integration of markets for commodities, land, labour and capital, as well 
as the formation of regimes for the discovery and diffusion of useful and reliable 
knowledge for purposes of production. 
Adam Smith’s name cannot, however, be appropriated for a ‘Washington consensus’ in 
favour of minimalist intervention by governments, because he explicitly forbade no 
actions by states (particularly in the geopolitical sphere) that might be in a nation’s 
interest and his writings provide clear intellectual justifications for the provision of 
public goods. Nevertheless, Smithian growth has now acquired a meaning that is 
congruent with antipathies embodied in new institutional economics and the spillover of 
its vocabularies into European economic history which represent most forms of 
‘interference’ by states with the operations of competitive markets and private 
enterprise (today and in the past) as futile, perverse and motivated by rent seeking 
behaviour. ‘Smithian’ assertions that historically successful states promoted long-run 
growth in some regions of Europe (and Asia) basically by ‘encouraging’ the allocation 
of resources into activities and by motivating their utilization in ways that brought about 
a congruence between social and private returns can be contrasted, however, with a 
‘Listian’ or ‘Schumpeterian views of states doing much more than simply creating 
incentives for economic growth by redefining and protecting property rights, reducing 
transactions, search and negotiation costs for private production and exchange. This 
alternative tradition (more deeply rooted in European history) conceives and elaborates 
upon an altogether wider and more positive role for states. In contrast to Smithian 
approaches (which are basically concerned with barter and exchange) the 
Schumpeterian theory is centred in production and international trade and emphasises 
the role played by states in encouraging, protecting and investing in activities that in 
outcome enjoyed increasing returns over the long run. Willy-nilly, (and usually as a by-
product of geopolitical and political preoccupations) the strategies, policies and capital 
formation by some states promoted the development of sectors, industries, 
organizations, technologies and institutions which embodied economies of scale, scope, 
potential for learning, investment and structural change. 
Adam Smith certainly realized that for several centuries before the Industrial 
Revolution, the primary and urgent concerns of national states, in Europe, were not with   2
the specification and protection of property rights, the reduction of transaction costs, the 
extension of markets, the terms of exchange and the promotion of competition, but 
rather with their own formation in contexts of intensifying geopolitical and imperial 
violence and threats of invasion, as well as internal rivalries for control over resources 
with aristocratic magnates, urban oligarchies, ecclesiastical prelates and other serious 
contenders for wealth and authority within their own borders. Power prevailed over 
profit by a long way in the priorities of pre-modern states. Their main objectives 
included dynastic survival, territorial security and aggrandizement, the monopolization 
of internal coercion and the integration of diverse regional, ethnic and religious 
populations into ‘national’ polities, made subject to laws, promulgated, adjudicated and 
enforced by a sovereign source of authority. 
Some historical comprehension of when, where, how and why cities, regions, estates, 
countries and empires around the world obtained and retained the kind of autonomous 
centralized and effective government and administrative capacities required to support 
and sustain the construction of institutions required for long term development is a 
precondition for advance in new institutional economic theory. 
In Europe the beginnings of the process of state formation can be traced back to the 
powers and functions exercised by feudal rulers who emerged in the Middle Ages from 
the turmoil of rivalries among territorial warrior magnates for the status of primus inter 
pares. Their role as dynastic monarchies allowed them to deploy their own considerable 
resources, and to convene and coordinate military forces under the control of other 
powerful feudal ‘lords’ for: the ‘collective’ defence of confederated territories (which 
included estates, bishoprics and cities); for ‘collaborative’ attacks on rival 
confederations; for ‘cooperation’ to maintain internal stability and to preserve some 
kind of status quo in the distribution of property rights. 
Over centuries of violent transition from a multiplicity of feudal confederations, to 
closer federations and on to states with more or less effective and efficient monopolies 
over the means (armed forces and revenues) required for coercion, Europe’s potential 
sovereigns attempted to centralize and to realize the economies of scale, scope and 
specialization embodied in effectively organized, increasingly capital-intensive armies 
and navies, equipped with modern technologies for defence and aggression. 
Geopolitical imperatives driven by dynastic rivalry as well as advances in the 
technologies and organization associated with the delivery of violence, prompted rulers 
everywhere to progress from acting as coordinators of the military and naval power 
available within their frontiers, towards positions of command over the means of 
coercion required for the defence of vulnerable territory, national wealth and ‘domestic’ 
fiscal bases. 
Their ‘trajectory’ towards centralization, which proceeded falteringly along several 
routes at different speeds across the continents and within political arenas of embryo 
nations, is a history marked by varying degrees of opposition from estates, aristocracies, 
urban oligarchies, churches and other networks of power. Constrained by historically 
embedded centrifugal forces, rulers of Europe’s traditional polities constructed several 
types of state that gradually became more viable, stable, and autonomous enough to 
afford governance for private economies in the specific political and geopolitical 
contexts in which they happened to be located.   3
European state formation (as an inter-related process of coercion , cooperation and co-
option) took centuries to complete and was marked by accident, contingency relapses 
and political discontinuities of every kind. Acting within the imperatives of a violent, 
unstable and competitive geopolitical order, centralizing monarchies, oligarchies and 
power elites (funded by taxes appropriated from accessible fiscal bases and from time to 
time from wealth expropriated from internal rivals and enemies) ‘struggled’ to construct 
states that could protect and regulate national economies. They simultaneously coerced 
and co-opted rival claimants to local powers (ancient kingdoms, estates, territorial 
magnates, ecclesiastical authorities, cities, towns and rebellious artisans and peasants) 
into compliance with their agendas to fund and construct sovereign states. Co-option, 
which is now perceived to have been as significant as coercion in the formation of 
Europe’s ancien regimes, involved sovereigns and their bureaucracies in complex 
political settlements with aristocracies and other traditional elites over: separations of 
power, rights to assess, collect and profit from ‘royal’ revenues, patronage to appoint to 
senior positions in the armies, navies, churches, judiciaries and the evolving 
bureaucracies of realms and republics. Even the construction of armed forces for the 
execution of royal or oligarchical policies included systems of permanent negotiation 
between rulers and other elites in the formation and management of the departments and 
organizations of monarchical and othe types of regime. 
Historians of state formation and political economy have long recognized that the scale, 
difficulties and costs of maintaining administrations and organizations to supply public 
goods required to provide external security, political stability internal order, and the 
coordination of economic agents, varied with geographies and with differences across 
cultures and changed through time. Rulers of compact contiguous territories surrounded 
by water and containing populations of similar ethnic and religious identities, pervaded 
by cultures of patriotism and deference to hereditary authorities and loyalty to kings and 
city patriarchies did not confront the same logistical problems, resistance and 
enforcement costs as rulers of dispersed territories with long frontiers that contained 
multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and multi-religious populations. 
But everywhere in Europe the formation of stronger, more centralized and stable states 
involved divisions of power and the sharing of rents with established stakeholders in 
national wealth, regardless of whether the settlements over terms for coordination, 
collaboration and cooperation were reached formally after due process with 
‘representative’ assemblies of ‘notables’ or operated informally and implicitly in the 
ways that ostensibly autocratic decisions were made and above all carried into effect by 
‘privatized’ administrations ‘under contract’ to ruling houses and oligarchies or 
implemented by hierarchical organizations of their own making and ostensibly under 
royal command. 
Historical trajectories along which Europe’s competing polities evolved into centralized 
states exemplify contrasts which historians have analysed since the Enlightenment in 
teleological terms as precocious or protracted transitions to freedom and democracy. 
The preoccupations of philosophers, political scientists and latterly neo-classical 
economists cannot be connected never mind precisely correlated with the priorities 
accorded by rulers to the development of economies or to the efficiencies of the 
organizations and institutions set up to provide those essential preconditions for any 
kind of sustained economic growth, namely external security, internal order, political 
stability, efficiently protected property rights, regulated markets and functional fiscal 
systems.   4
Until acceptable correlations can be established, or impressive samples of historical 
cases, mobilized to relate ‘constitutions for liberty’ with economic growth, historians in 
touch with the European past (never mind the records Tang, Sung, Ming and Qing 
China) will remain agnostic on the frequently quoted proclamations of close and 
ubiquitous connexions between freedom and growth from the times of Monesquieu to 
the theories of Buchanan. In recent years they have, however, become more attracted to 
micro and more middle range theories from new institutional economics which have 
redrawn attention to the significance of particular examples of institutions, 
organizations, laws, rules, customs and culturally conditioned behaviour for the 
development of specific sectors, industries, firms, trades and urban complexes. Modern 
economics has expanded its remit to include matters that Cunningham recommended to 
Marshal and is currently sustaining a programme of classifying, theorizing (occasionally 
purporting to measure) how a range of institutional variables conditioned both the flow 
and the productivity of the inputs of land, labour, capital, technology and other more 
proximate determinants of national economic growth. 
Perhaps economic historians, engaged with traditions of enquiry going back to the 
German historical school, and who have retained links with history, had less need than 
their colleagues in economics to be reminded that production and exchange across early 
modern Eurasia were embedded in diverse and in less than enabling frameworks of law, 
institutions and cultures. Although the taxonomies and insights derived from this still 
evolving branch of economics are certainly enlightening to contemplate, there is one 
foundational premise where this so-called ‘new’ paradigm for research seems seriously 
ill-informed and under-specified. Ships adrift on uncharted waters certainly deserve 
credit for every mile travelled in the right direction, but the economic theory of 
institutions has not left harbour when it comes to analysing and explaining the 
formation and behaviour of states. 
That represents a serious lacunae because throughout history states created and 
sustained the ‘local’ legal frameworks and institutions within which productive and 
counter-productive activities occurred. States defined and enforced property rights. 
States solved or failed to solve the contractual, infra-structural and coordination 
problems involved in extending and integrating markets. States reordered or neglected 
to reorder ideologies, religions and cultures of behaviour in order to reduce shirking, 
cheating, free-riding moral hazards and transaction costs and to encourage thrift, work 
and innovation. Above all, states supplied economies (bounded by vulnerable frontiers 
and engaged in the dangers of ‘foreign’ trade) with those vitally important public goods, 
external security, protection at sea and internal order without which investment, 
innovation, production and exchange could only have remained at levels that produced 
stasis rather than growth. 
Of course, in normal, peaceable interludes, a great deal of subsistence (and ‘embodied’) 
production, even local and regional (but rarely international) trade continued with 
limited reference to states on the basis of customary norms and behaviour. But without 
states and the laws, institutions and protection that they provided, the gains from trade 
and specialization could not be exploited to realize a potential for growth. 
Unless economic historians choose (like economists) to ‘endogeonize’ their role and 
thereby support convenient but superficial predictions and retrodictions that the 
constitutions of states and frameworks of rules for the operation of economic activity 
altered as and when it became ‘sufficiently profitable’ for ‘rulers’, ‘innovators’ or   5
‘revolutionaries’ to bring about positive change, they must conclude that new 
institutional economics, lacks anything approximating to a theory of state formation and 
mutatis mutandis of institution building and innovation. 
So does history! Even though the preoccupations of most historians have always been 
with the evolution of states, laws, rules, religions, ideologies and cultures conditioning 
personal and group behaviour. History’s libraries are dominated by volumes of research 
into these matters for particular places at particular times. Most historians do not 
recognize, however, that the formation of states took place in arenas that can be 
simulated to market places. They do not find attempts to model the actions, inactions or 
failures of rulers and their servants with reference to ‘trade-offs’, ‘rent seeking’ of even 
that altogether more promising theory of the ostensibly ubiquitous ‘revenue 
maximizing’ behaviour of rulers (derived from the reflexions of Frederick Lane) 
particularly illuminating. Perhaps there is too much violence, path dependence, vested 
interest, custom, inertia and bargaining recorded for national and local histories of 
political change and no overriding and persistent objective that rulers attempted to 
maximize for economic theory to be of serious help with the mega and interrelated 
problems of state formation, strategies for development and institution building. 
More insights might become available from theories formulated to model the evolution 
of competitive advantages in incentive systems embodied in large scale, hierarchically 
organized firms, producing goods and services for sale to consumers. Economics begins 
to extend modern theories of industrial organization to explore the conditions for 
efficiency among complex organizations with less clear cut objectives but charged to 
deliver public goods, such as health, education, protection against crime, etc. 
Unfortunately a whole generation of literature has been ideologically concerned simply 
to expose bureaucratic failures, anachronistically represented as: corruption, rent 
seeking, inertia, rigidities and other theoretically plausible attributes of organizations 
designed and run by states for multiple purposes, but which were historically in Europe 
only tangentially connected to requirements for the efficient operation of factor and 
commodity markets. Economic analysis is well designed to offer recommendations for 
the construction and management of organizations charged with single or 
complementary missions, but has a lot less to offer when it comes to comprehending 
designing or evaluating institutions with multiple and conflicting objectives. 
In Europe and till very late in the nineteenth century, corruption, rent seeking, free 
riding, moral hazards and every conceivable kind of principle agent problem continued 
to be the omnipresent and daily concerns of states attempting to manage their armies, 
navies and fiscal systems and other branches of administration. The political constraints 
on developing departments and institutions nominally under the control of rulers and 
their advisers, to deliver public goods at acceptable ‘fiscal’ and ‘political’ costs were 
then and continue, in many third world countries today, to be formidable. Historians in 
touch with the sources and aware of the constraints surrounding states during the 
periods that they study recognize that the modes and scale of public and quasi-public 
organizations, the systems in place for the recruitment of personnel, levels of 
corruption, degrees of rigidity and rent seeking simply exemplify the multiple objectives 
and restraints constraining the operation of Europe’s ancien regimes of all political 
forms. On the one hand rulers made ‘unavoidable’ political bargains and comprises 
required to secure stability, but their political interest on the other was to maintain, 
increase and centralize power by supplying external security, victories in war, and   6
internal order on terms that did not threaten their own property rights, legitimacy and 
dynastic succession. 
During the long transition to ‘Weberian’ ideals of sovereignty, administrative 
competence and national bureaucracy which provides scope for functional levels of 
efficiency, the organizational capacities at the disposal of every conceivable kind of 
political regime (imperial, parliamentary, monarchical, oligarchical, republican and 
absolutist alike) remained severely constrained by the existing, if evolving, technologies 
for communication and control, as well as the omnipresent political difficulties of 
establishing organizations to implement policies, however, benign for growth.  That 
may seem less obvious at the courts and capitals of emperors and kings and the 
chambers of oligarchies where many rulers benefited from the advice and support from 
talented ‘servants’, often recruited from the church and the law or in China through a 
meritocratic examination system – admired by Voltaire and other enlightened European 
intellectuals of his day. Yet these loyal servants engaged in the execution of the policies 
of sovereigns continue to be represented as rent seekers, pursuing interests, antithetical 
to economic progress. Even though their albeit sometimes sycophantic devotion to 
rulers and opposition to rival centres of power meant that they pursued missions to 
rationalize and universalise the formulation of rules; to support established procedures 
for their adjudication and to enforce and monitor the execution of policies. 
To implement policies even those involving the armed forces of the Crown they 
resorted frequently to markets and franchising. Private firms often networked in tandem 
with politically appointed hierarchies to deliver public goods, designed for coercion and 
other purposes. Debate on the boundaries of private and public sectors goes back a very 
long way. Furthermore, and regardless of their pretensions to rule by dynastic authority 
(with or without divine rights) or claims to legitimacy bestowed by unrepresentative 
assemblies of notables, nothing much could be accomplished without command over 
resources. That is why generations of historians have analysed the political economy of 
taxation at the heart of state formation. How different states constructed and sustained 
complex fiscal policies and how well their trusted advisers, franchised administrations 
or appointed bureaucracies charged to assess and collect an astonishing variety of direct 
and indirect taxed performed has been under investigation since David Hume. 
II  Liberal and mercantilist narratives of state formation in the United Kingdom 
2.1  Liberal myths and mercantilist realities 
In retrospect it seems clear from Europe’s historical records that some states (England, 
and Holland – the First Modern Economy) constructed and managed the bureaucracies, 
departments and complex organizations required to raise revenues, solve problems, 
preserve stability and delivery arrays of public goods that promoted rather than 
restrained economic growth sooner and more effectively than others (e.g. France, Spain 
and Austria) and that political pre-requisites for the formation and integration of 
markets occurred in China long before Europe, South America and Africa. 
This work could not hope to provide the basis for the construction of a general theory of 
state formation, state behaviour and institution building by states. Historical case studies   7
might, however, expose the geographical, economic and political conditions that 
favoured the emergence of ideal type ‘Weberian’ states in some polities before others. It 
will be my aim (in brief compass) to restore a representation of state formation and 
institution building in the United Kingdom that degrades an established ‘Whig’ view of 
the process and undermines the deployment of Britain’s famous economic transition to 
an industrial market economy as a, if not the, ‘paradigm case’, supporting a Washington 
consensus for laissez-faire, free trade, democratic governance and the triumph of private 
enterprises virtually unassisted by help from the state. 
Unfortunately (and as liberal myth that is understandably congenial to modern 
economics) by default something approximating to that consensus has also dominated 
the writing of British economic history since Ashton published his classic text on the 
Industrial Revolution in 1948. As a scion of the Manchester school Ashton almost 
ignores central government because he wrote history from below and saw entrepreneurs 
and artisans as the prime movers behind the Industrial Revolution and observed that ‘the 
instinct of the industrialists was to eschew politics. It was not by the arts of lobbying or 
propaganda, but by unremitting attention to their concerns … they became a power – 
perhaps the greatest power – in the state’. His neglect of metropolitan government 
(followed by almost all writers of textbooks on this famous conjuncture in British 
history right down to the present day), emanates not only simply from ideological 
representations of the nature of the kingdom’s pre-industrial ancien regime as one from 
corrupt aristocratic and expensive governance – a view derived from Adam Smith – but 
more significantly a preconception that flows from a shortened chronology for any 
serious historical analysis of Britain’s precocious transition to an industrial market 
economy. Unfortunately, and short of time to keep up with a voluminous and complex 
historiography, with ideological agendas of their own and carrying from their 
schoolbooks recollections of the ‘Whig’ tradition in England’s political history, the new 
political economy of the Glorious Revolution continues to represent a coup d’état in 
1688 as a triumph for democratic rule over royal tyranny; a victory for private enterprise 
over public monopolies, a felicitous substitution of science for religion, and more 
recently as a commitment by way of the triumph of ‘Parliamentary’ governance to 
secure property rights and the rule law. It is no surprise that modern institutional 
economists rely upon anachronistic history. They find it easier to reach for the First 
Industrial Revolution as the paradigm example, embodying a ‘teleology’ of political 
commitments to an optimally designed set of ‘liberal’ institutions for long term 
economic growth. 
Braudel insisted, however, that the formation of states which accompanied the growth 
of economies can only be comprehended by studying very long time spans, which will 
allow underlying (geographical, geopolitical and political forces) conditioning 
economic performance to be exposed, not as waves on the water, but as the sea bed. By 
focussing on la longue durée, historians might locate structural parameters as well as 
significant conjunctures or discontinuities which, looked at retrospectively, from some 
vantage or end point can help social scientists to mobilize historical evidence in order to 
provide statistical foundations, to shape a more plausible narrative and to endow it with 
theoretical and rhetorically persuasive power. 
Alas, only a précis of the complex history of English state formation (1453-1815) as a 
necessary perspective and basis for the comprehension of institution building could 
possibly be presented within an essay, attempting to represent long run geopolitical and 
political history of an island kingdom. The representation of the fiscal and budgetary   8
‘architecture’ of a state behind the construction of English institutions might however 
expose conjunctures in its formation, which did not occur as an outcome of the Glorious 
revolution of 1688, in the wake of the publication of the Wealth of Nations in 1776, or 
even follow the passage of the first Parliamentary reform bill of 1832, but rather ‘came 
to pass’ with the final defeat (1805-15) of Dutch, Iberian, American and above all, 
French pretensions to countervail the realm’s conjoined ‘mercantilist and maritime 
strategy’ for: the provision of those all important and persuasive public goods: the 
security of the realm, internal stability, and the acquisition and preservation of the 
largest occidental empire since Rome. 
2.2  The formation of a fiscal state 
Economically Britain did exceptionally well during a long boom in global commerce 
that succeeded the consolidation of the Qing dynasty (1644-83) and which coincided 
with the break-up of the Mughal empire in India (1761-1818). Was that (as ‘Weberian’ 
global historians maintain) because the country’s institutions (particularly its 
Parliamentary system of governance) and its cultures of behaviour and enterprise had 
become clearly more hospitable to private investment and innovation than rivals on the 
mainland as well as maritime China and Tokugawa Japan? Comparative research into 
the histories of European institutions has left us more agnostic about the particularities 
and superiorities of the realm’s institutions. While recently rediscovered ‘worlds of 
surprising resemblances’ across a range of advanced economic regions of Eurasia 
undergoing Smithian growth for centuries before the First Industrial Revolution has 
effectively degraded both Marxian and Weberian perceptions that only certain countries 
of North Western Europe (particularly England), had proceeded far along trajectories or 
up learning curves leading to modern economic growth. 
For all that, there is one (and a potentially significant?) contrast between Britain and all 
other pre-modern candidates for a First and Early Industrial Revolution. The salient 
contrast (under restoration here) is the kingdom’s geographically conditioned process of 
state formation which became inseparable from a sustained commitment by Crown and 
Parliament to a maritime strategy for the defence of the realm and which, over time, 
turned out to carry unintended but benign consequences for the development of the 
economy. 
As men of the pen, writing during a liberal international economic order that succeeded 
centuries of mercantilism and imperial conflict, from 1415-1815, economic historians of 
the First Industrial Revolution have not accorded sufficient weight to geopolitical 
policies and strategic investments by the state (in close partnership with private 
enterprise) that carried the realm’s maritime economy to a plateau of possibilities from 
where the kingdom’s precocious transition to an industrial society became first possible 
and then probable.  
Not long after the First Hundred Years War (1337-1453) when England’s feudal armies 
had ignominiously retreated from centuries of dynastic and imperialistic warfare on the 
mainland, the Island’s kings, aristocrats and merchants began to conceive of naval 
power as the first line of defence against external threats to the security of their realm 
and as the force required to back conquest and commerce with continents other than 
mainland Europe. For several reasons that conception took nearly two centuries (1453-
1649) to mature into a political and fiscal commitment for the defence of a vulnerable   9
and unstable kingdom and for the realization of its potential as a maritime power and 
economy. First, internal colonization, the expropriation of ecclesiastical property, 
predation and free riding upon Iberian research development and investments required 
to support commerce with Asia and colonization in the Americas continued to be more 
attractive and easier options for Tudor and Stuart monarchs and their coteries of 
courtiers and predatory territorial magnates to pursue. Second, and despite the 
vulnerability of the dynasty and the kingdom to threats of takeover, first by France in 
the reign of Henry VIII and then more seriously by Spanish Armadas, despatched by 
Philip II, the aristocracies and the propertied elites assembled in the Houses of Lords 
and Commons to discuss taxes (and very little else except religion) successfully resisted 
all attempts by the Crown to deepen and widen its fiscal base in order to fund the 
resources required to establish standing forces (armies and navies) of sufficient scale, 
scope and technological capability to defend the realm, maintain internal order and 
protect private investment in commerce and colonization overseas. 
Eventually nearly two centuries of fiscal stasis, economically malign disputes over 
religion and persistent acrimony over the crown’s rights to taxation, culminated in an 
‘interregnum’ of highly destructive civil war, republican rule, and the restoration of 
monarchy and aristocracy, which in outcome led to the formation of a modern and 
relatively effective English state. 
 
 
Graph 1 Total taxes, 1490-1820 
 
Notes:   The points plotted are 9-year moving averages for every tenth year 1490-1820, measured in 
constant prices of 1451-75. 
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As well as truly massive destruction of life and capital, this famous interregnum 
witnessed: the most serious threats to hierarchy and property rights in English history 
before the spread of mass democracy in the late nineteenth century; the appreciation by 
wealthy elites (represented in Parliament) of the advantages attending the establishment 
of a standing fleet of warships under control of the Crown, for the defence of an island 
realm, as well as the externalities generated by a Royal Navy for the maintenance of that 
other and equally significant public good – internal order. Above all, the majority of 
stakeholders in the wealth of the realm recognized the need for the reconstruction of a 
fiscal and financial system that could provide the funds required for its security, for the 
stability of the regime and for the maintenance and protection of an established and 
highly inegalitarian system of property rights, representing assets and capital located 
within the kingdom, in merchant ships on the high seas or in bases, plantations and 
colonies in England’s expanding empire in the Americas, Africa and Asia. 
Following on from a series of republican and royalist experiments with the political 
principles, methods of assessment and collection of taxes, a ‘reconstructed’ fiscal base 
came into place under the restored Stuart monarchy. Constitutionally that base rested, 
first and foremost, upon the reaffirmation by the Crown of the long-established tradition 
(challenged under provocation by Charles I) that English monarchs could not levy taxes 
without formal consent from Parliament. 
Thereafter, Parliament never presumed to control royal expenditures and hardly ever 
withheld consent for supply; particularly in wartime, when the loyalty of honourable 
members to the protestant succession could be called into question by aristocratic 
patrons or arraigned at the bar of xenophobic and loyal public opinion. In practice flows 
of revenue and predictable degrees of compliance with demands from the state 
depended upon three major and quasi-constitutional reforms that were effectively 
institutionalised before the Dutch coup d’état (Glorious Revolution) of 1688. 
First (and before Pitt’s Income Tax Act in 1799) the restored state reluctantly 
abandoned a history of futile attempts, going back to Domesday of 1086, to assess direct 
taxes on the income and wealth of households according to some pre-specified, 
transparent and centrally monitored criteria to pay. Instead the Crown settled (with no 
serious resistance from Parliament) for an extension of royal powers over indirect taxes 
and for control of public administrations (which replaced franchised tax farming) as the 
way to assess and collect duties levied upon an ever-extending range of goods and 
services produced and/or consumed within the kingdom. Customs duties, which had 
been part of England’s fiscal constitution since the Middle Ages, were thereby 
supplemented and complemented by excise and stamp ‘duties’ (long established on the 
mainland) to form an integrated and productive system of indirect taxation. 
Complementarities and coherence in fiscal policy then came into operation because the 
selected and carefully calibrated range of products and services subjected to these novel 
duties in effect received virtually complete protection from imports and exemptions (in 
some cases bounties) when exported or re-exported overseas. Following the 
interregnum an accelerated and radical shift from direct to indirect forms of taxation 
(from 60 per cent to 70 per cent of totals collected by the Tudor monarchy to around 25 
per cent under the Hanoverians) the system became outstandingly successful in 
supplying the English state with the revenues required to fund the provision of external 
security and internal stability with commercial and imperial expansion overseas.   11
Between 1670 and 1810 total revenues from taxes rose around 16 times in real terms, 
while national income increased by a multiplier of 3. 
Third, steady and predictable inflows of indirect taxes provided the state with sufficient 
inflows of stable income to borrow ever increasing amounts of money in the form of 
redeemable, irredeemable, short and long-term loans on London, Amsterdam and other 
European capital markets. Loans (also subject to formal but never withheld 
Parliamentary approval) serviced by hypothecated receipts from indirect taxes 
introduced an all important element of flexibility into the capacities of the English state 
to fund public goods and to support an altogether more aggressive and expansionist, 
mercantilist and geopolitical strategies against rival European (and eventually Asian) 
economies for gains from trade and colonization overseas. 
For example, between 1652 and 1815 the English state engaged in no less than eleven 
wars against European powers and economic competitors (mainly conflicts with France 
and Spain, but including four wars against the Netherlands). After 1689 something like 
80 per cent of all the incremental revenues required to mobilize its forces emanated 
from loans and the nominal capital of the national debt grew from less than £2 million 
in the reign of James II to the astronomical sum of £854 million or 2.7 times the 
national income for 1819 and the share of taxes devoted to servicing government debt 
jumped from modal ratios of 2-3 per cent before the Glorious Revolution to 60 per cent 
after the Napoleonic War. When Castlereagh signed the Treaty of Vienna in 1815 
(which effectively marks the end of the era of mercantilism) the, by then, United 
Kingdom was recognized to possess unchallengeable hegemony at sea, controlled the 
largest occidental empire since Rome, enjoyed extraordinary shares of world trade and 
income from servicing global commerce and its domestic economy stood half way 
through an Industrial Revolution. 
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Chart 1 Annual average expenditures on the army and navy, 1661-66 to 1709-14 

















One of the major reasons why Britain found itself in such an envied and feared position 
at that Congress (a conjuncture in European and geopolitical history) is because the 
restored and reconstructed Stuart state (taken over by William of Orange and his 
German successors) allocated very high and rising proportions (85 per cent is the modal 
ratio) of all the rapidly increased flows of revenue made available to them by British 
taxpayers and by British and foreign investors to sustain much larger (and possibly 
more efficient) armies and navies than had been possible for two centuries before and 
for some decades in the aftermath of the Republic. 
Chart 2 Total tax revenues expressed as shares of conjectures for national income,  
1490s to 1810 
percentage 
 
Notes:   The ratios, measured in current prices, refer to the lowest percentage for a given peace time 
year and the highest percentage for a war year within each decade. In the 1490s the king 
collected a low of 1.3 per cent in peacetime and a high of 4.1 per cent in wartime. 
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Apart from contemporary and recently repeated Whig spin, the significant outcomes 
that flowed from the Glorious Revolution of 1688 resided above all in the profound 
changes to the realm’s foreign and strategic policies and an immediate and sharp rise in 
real expenditures on the armed forces. 
That uplift in claims by forces of the Crown on national resources was sustained over a 
Second Hundred Years War with France, increased erratically from war to war to reach 
a very high ratio of around 15 per cent of gross domestic product by the closing years of 
the final conflict with Napoleon. 
2.3  The maritime strategy for ‘the safety, honour and welfare of the realm’ 
1689-1939 
In an international economic order riven with dynastic, imperial and geopolitical 
rivalries, the need for an Island state to allocate considerable resources to preclude 
invasion, preserve internal stability and retain advantages over its equally violent 
competitors in armed struggles for gains from global commerce and colonization 
formed inescapable parameters within which institution building along with macro 
economic growth occurred. In that order, counterfactual scenarios and analyses 
concerned with the distortions from competitive equilibria wrought by taxation or the 
unmeasured ‘crowding out’ effects that flowed from high levels of government 
borrowing are interesting, but anachronistic exercises for economics to pursue. These 
exercises are, moreover, largely irrelevant to questions of whether the English state 
raised and allocated the resources that carried the kingdom and its economy to a plateau 
of safety, political stability and potential for future development attained and envied at 
the Congress of Vienna, and proceeded in ways that could be plausibly represented as 
more or less efficient for building of institutions and the growth of the economy. Since 
nobody then or now has elaborated alternative strategies which combined security for 
the realm with the growth for the economy, the advice of historians to study what was 
done, compare English strategies with those pursued by other European and Asian 
powers and perhaps conclude with Pangloss that virtually everything that was done was 
done for the best in the worst of all possible worlds looks sensible. 
In retrospect that appears to be a persuasive stance to take on the maritime strategy 
pursued for the defence of the Isles, (a persuasive notion floating under the Tudors and 
early Stuarts) but taken forward during the Commonwealth to mature into a well-funded 
and binding commitment by the state to a standing navy of the size and technical 
capability required to preclude invasions of the Isles from offshore. That commitment 
which continued to our own era of airpower made sense to an isolated Republic 
threatened with Royalist inspired privateering on its trade, with invasions supported by 
outraged kings from the mainland, but in possession of funds (realized from the sale of 
the expropriated wealth of the monarch and his treasonable supporters) to invest heavily 
in the construction of warships. Ironically Cromwell’s large ‘model fleet’ escorted 
Charles II back to his kingdom and the Restored state (stimulated into widespread 
anxiety by Colbert’s programme to build a modern and superior French Navy) 
constructed and maintained the largest and most powerful navy in Europe. Thereafter 
(with occasional lapses) the Royal Navy defended the realm, won a string of famous 
victories at sea and (through a range of benign interconnexions) helped, in no small 
way, to carry an expanding maritime and leading sector of the British economy towards 
levels of integration, competitive efficiency and potential for future development   14
achieved during the Industrial Revolution and which became manifestly obvious 
between 1846-73. 
Persistently high levels of public expenditure on the Royal Navy probably exceeded 
allocations for gross domestic capital formation between 1760 and 1810 and in times of 
war amounted to around half of the value of Britain’s exports, plus re-exports. This 
commitment provided the kingdom with Europe’s (the world’s) largest fleet of 
battleships, cruisers and frigates, manned by a largely coerced workforce of able 
seamen, managed by well motivated officers. The fleet was constructed and maintained 
in readiness for multiple missions by a skilled workforce of shipwrights, carpenters and 
other artisans and serviced by an infra-structure of ports, harbours, dockyards, stores for 
victuals and spare parts, ordnance depots and other onshore facilities in both public and 
private ownership and control. 
Once a huge fleet and its onshore infra-structure of human and physical capital were 
operating primarily to keep ships of the line strategically placed at sea as the first 
bastion of defence for the realm; and secondarily (but at falling average cost) to sustain 
cruisers, frigates and other well armed ships on ‘mercantilist missions’ for the 
protection of British trade and its colonies; for the predation on all ‘hostile’ and 
potentially hostile merchant marines; for the bombardment of the enemy’s maritime 
cities and colonies, for the interdiction of competitive trade, and finally for gunboat 
diplomacy, then the English states evolving maritime strategy turned out to include all 
kinds of attendant advantages for internal stability, for protection of property rights and 
the growth of Britain’s home and colonial economies. 
First, a large fleet of durable, strategically placed and proficient ships of the line 
(floating fortresses) provided external security at a relatively high level of efficiency 
compared to the logistical costs per joule of force delivered by large armies, recruited, 
mobilized, equipped, supplied with food and forage and moved overland to 
battlegrounds, places of siege and vulnerable borders to repel enemy attacks. 




















































Source: Glete (1993)   15
Chart 4 Average annual expenditures on the army and navy, 1689-1815 
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The relatively low costs, and in outcome, highly successful and economically 
significant offshore strategy for defence allowed the British state to spend more upon 
armed forces and to allocate greater proportions of its already elastic fiscal and financial 
resources not only to complementary mercantilist and imperial missions pursued at sea, 
but to sustain surprisingly high levels of military expenditure. Throughout the period 
1688-1815, the military share of expenditures on armed forces by the European state 
most committed to naval defence and aggression amounted to a modal 60 per cent. 
Part of that allocation included the costs of hiring of mercenary regiments of 
Hanoverian, Hessian and other soldiers for combat outside the kingdom; part consisted 
of subsidies and subventions to Britain’s European allies willing to field or threaten to 
field troops to contain and thwart the designs of France and its allies on the mainland, or 
in India and the Americas; and finally, part consisted of the commitment of British 
troops to theatres of war on the continent, notably in 1702-12 and 1808-15. 
Expenditures on military forces engaged directly or indirectly with rival armies 
prevented Bourbon states (France and Spain) and their European allies from allocating 
funds to construct fleets of a size and capability required to mount serious challenges to 
the Royal Navy’s defence of the realm and its increasingly effective protection of 
British interests overseas. 
By far the largest proportion was allocated, however, to British regiments, militias, 
volunteers and yeomanry on stations in the realm as a less than credible second line of 
defence against serious invasions, but utilized consistently, successfully and 
economically over this period of population growth and rapid urbanization to preserve 
the stability of the regime against subversion and to protect hierarchy and property 
rights against sporadic but rather persistent challenges to law and order. 
Prospects for trade across a less than united Kingdom came, from time to time, under 
serious threat from within the potentially seditious provinces of Scotland and Ireland; 
particularly the latter where a colonized Catholic population resented ‘English’ property 
rights and the metropole’s discriminatory regulation of local commerce and industry. 
With external security taken as given, stability, good order, respect for an established 
inegalitarian system of property rights and the maintenance of hierarchy over their   16
potentially unruly employees became a key political-cum-economic interest for 
landowners, merchants, farmers, industrialists and other businessmen of Hanoverian 
Britain. On the whole, their ‘monarchical and aristocratic’ state met concerns for the 
protection of property, for the maintenance of authority over workforces and when 
necessary redefined their legal rights by promulgating statutes for the realm which 
superseded custom and common laws that could be interpreted as providing protection 
for the welfare of the majority of the nation’s workforce without assets, status and 
power. 
For example, the institutions of the Elizabethan poor law for dealing with poverty, 
unemployment, vagrancy and labour migration maintained a repressive system of 
control over the labour of juveniles, females and unskilled men. For less vulnerable and 
governable groups of artisans and industrial workers and, especially for groups who 
formed ‘combinations’ to challenge what they perceived to be adverse changes in a 
traditional and more moral economy, the punishments prescribed by Parliament for: the 
formation of unions; for riots against high prices of basic necessities; for resistance to 
enclosures and turnpikes; for attacks upon mills, barns, factories and labour saving 
machinery; for insubordinate and disorderly conduct as well as every kind of theft 
became discernibly harsher and, under the bloody code, increasingly lethal. 
Modern social historians (less impressed than their Whig predecessors with 
Parliament’s rhetorical antipathies to standing armies in times of peace) have made us 
aware that the actual numbers of troops, embodied militiamen and patriotic volunteers 
on station in Britain and Ireland year after year (and particularly in wartime) were more 
than adequate to deter and repress disturbances to the peace. For purposes of political 
stability, maintaining internal order, the protection of property and upholding 
hierarchies of all kinds, it is not at all obvious that on a per capita basis, the political and 
legal authorities of constitutional Britain commanded and used less effective coercive 
force than those military despotisms on the mainland of Europe. Indeed in 1808 the 
numbers of soldiers mobilized to combat Luddites in the Midlands and North of 
England exceeded troops under Wellington’s command in the Peninsular. 
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2.4  Conclusions: the security, stability and growth of the realm 
Somehow through eleven wars (which included three, perhaps four, occasions when 
French and Spanish admirals failed to take advantage of openings in the kingdom’s first 
line of defence) the Royal Navy retained command of the Channel and the North Sea. 
Throughout the period which witnessed Britain’s combined geopolitical and economic 
rise, the Navy’s guard over Western and Eastern approaches to the Isles, blockades of 
enemy naval bases, the interdiction of their supplies of strategic raw materials and 
weapons and occasional pre-emptive strikes effectively prevented a rival fleet from 
clearing a viable sea route for the landing of armies on the kingdom’s shores. For 
centuries before and throughout the dangerous period of expansion overseas after 1688 
neither aggressive foreign (nor defensive British) troops ever ravaged, taxes and looted 
the nation’s towns, terrorised or infected its population, destroyed its capital or 
ransacked its inventories of grain, animals, industrial raw materials and transport 
equipment; let alone undermined the stability or even changed the policies and 
institutions of autocratic Orange and Hanoverian regimes. In wartime the proportions of 
the British workforce (particularly skilled artisans) drafted into the army (the country’s 
secondary line of defence) remained low. Troops (and embodied militias) required for 
defence and service overseas could, moreover, be recruited overwhelmingly from 
among the unskilled potentially unemployed fringes (often Celtic and Colonial) of an 
expanding imperial workforce or, when necessary, hired as mercenary soldiers from 
labour abundant societies on the mainland. Furthermore, and while the Navy operated as 
the realm’s main relatively cheap but highly effective first line of defence, the state 
funded and maintained a royal army which (together with local militias) provided not 
only an albeit potentially inadequate second line of defence, but remained on call and 
active for the preservation of the internal order necessary for investment and economic 
growth. With virtually no civil police at their command, the Navy allowed the political 
authorities (central and local) of Hanoverian Britain to allocate less of their revenues 
and to give smaller weight to external security and more towards the provision of an 
effective military presence and exemplary displays of the armed and flexible force 
required to maintain good order, protect property and preserve authority over a 
potentially ‘ungovernable population’ and a society becoming more urban, industrial 
and deferential perforce by the year. 
Although the fiscal base, direct benefits and externalities from the state’s unswerving 
commitment to a maritime strategy became clear enough after the interregnum, naval 
historians would certainly be dissatisfied with any explanation which accounted for the 
long term superiority for ‘their’ Royal Navy in terms of geographical advantages, 
complemented by the formation of a fiscal and financial base, that after a delivered 
interregnum of civil war and republican government delivered the high and persistent 
levels of investment in warships and their on-shore infra-structural support systems 
required for the defence of the realm. Naval historians discuss: technological and 
economic leads and lags in the costs and designs of European warships and their guns; 
the quality of British, compared to foreign crews of seamen serving aboard warships; 
the recruitment, promotion and incentive systems surrounding officers in charge of 
battleships, cruisers and frigates. Furthermore, (but only latterly) they have engaged 
with the relative efficiencies of centrally coordinated organizations, firms and networks 
on shore that constructed, repaired and maintained armed ships as well as the with 
admiralties, boards and commissions that recruited and motivated officers and coerced 
crews to achieve an evolving plurality of objectives selected by states for their standing 
navies.   18
Repeated assertions (written in the glow of victories at sea) that the long run success of 
the Royal Navy is clearly imputable to British technology, superior seamanship, bravery 
in battle, better tactics, carefully designed incentives, more efficient logistical support 
systems, the Nelson factor and, above all, to the capacities of Parliamentary systems of 
governance to formulate policies and construct complex organizations for their 
implementation and coordination, will be very difficult to demonstrate without an 
extensive research programme in institutional histories. The literature for systematic 
comparisons of navies as national institutions is not out there and it is not clear that 
economics theory will be that helpful. Meanwhile such claims are simply not proven. At 
present, but looking over the benign loops of inter-connexions between the Royal Navy 
on the one hand, the merchant marine, the fishing, shipping, shipbuilding and 
armaments industries, as well as the banking, insurance and other commercial services, 
afforded by Britain’s expanding waterborne trading sector on the other, economic 
historians might be more inclined to configure the Royal Navy at the hub of an 
evolving, integrating and progressive maritime sector of an Island economy. In short, 
they would represent British naval superiority as an indispensable protective shield of 
an engine for trade with growth, pressed forward along learning curves and cumulating 
mechanisms for reinforcement by the combined investments of the kingdom’s private 
and public sectors in a rather coherent strategy for security, stability, good order and 
precocious structural change.  
This could never be the comprehensive narrative of the First Industrial Revolution, but 
even as restored history from above, it makes for more plausible chapters in a story than 
books that highlight Parliamentary government, private enterprise, liberalism and 
laissez-faire. To perhaps some significant degree (and despite bawdlerized versions of 
Adam Smith) an Industrial Revolution emerged on the Isles as the outcome of 
aggressive and successful mercantilism. In the beginning was a fiscal state with its 
Royal Navy. 
 